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Abstract
We investigate and test hypotheses on how informed trading varies with market-wide factors and
the structural and trading characteristics of a firm. We find strong evidence of commonality in
informed trading, and a systematic dependence of informed trading on firm characteristics that is
largely consistent with intuition and earlier theory and empirical evidence, wherever available.
We accordingly decompose informed trading into two components: one that reflects information
asymmetry with respect to skilled information processors with potentially private information on
systematic factors or who generate a private informational advantage using public data; and an-
other unpredictable component that reflects truly private information, potentially of traditional
insiders. We test the pricing relevance of both these components and find that it is only the un-
predictable component reflecting truly private information that is priced, and is priced more
strongly and in a manner more robust than total informed trading. Our pricing-relevance results
strongly support Easley and O’Hara (2004) and do not support Hughes, et al. (2007).
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Informed Trading, InformationAsymmetry and Pricing of Informa-
tion Risk: Empirical Evidence from the NYSE
1. Introduction and Motivation
A large body of academic literature has modeled the role of private information in asset
markets, examined the inter-relationship between the resultant information asymmetry and the
trading actions of investors, investigated a wide range of other issues relevant to information
asymmetry, and importantly, provided empirical evidence that information asymmetry is priced
in the required rate of return.
This paper is anchored in the notion that information asymmetry need not necessarily
arise just from the prototypical “insiders” with firm-specific hard information, i.e. the corporate
managers and their affiliates, but could arise from skilled information processors with private in-
formation about market-wide systematic return factors (Subrahmanyam (1991); Hughes, et al.
(2007)), or the ability to generate a private informational advantage from skilled analysis of firm-
specific or market-wide public information (Kim and Verrechia (1994, 1997)). These skilled in-
formation processors could be unconnected to a firm but investing resources to acquire price-
relevant private information (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)) that can be specific to the firm or
sector-specific, or market-wide (Chordia, et al. (2000); Gilson, et al. (2001)), or related to the
trading environment (Madrigal (1996); Easley, et al. (1998)) or to the structural characteristics of
the firm (Bhushan (1989b); Dennis and Weston (2001); Odders-White and Ready (2006)). Ac-
cordingly, we partition observed information asymmetry into an unpredictable component based
on firm-specific (truly) private information, and a predictable component based on public infor-
mation, and arguably dependent not only on the trading and structural characteristics of the firm,
but also on market-wide factors, and thereby exhibiting commonality across stocks.2
It is empirically challenging to fully measure all dimensions of private information, but at
least a subset of such private information should arguably be revealed periodically to the market
through the trading actions of investors with access to private value-relevant information. We
empirically investigate information asymmetry through the use of two reasonably direct and most
extensively used market microstructure measures – the PIN measure developed, tested and used
in, for example, Easley and O'Hara (1992), Easley, et al. (1997a, b), and Easley, et al. (2002);
and the adverse selection measure widely used to directly proxy for informed trading (Huang and
Stoll (1996); Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997); and Hansch, et al. (1999)), representing the
spread revenue lost, on average, by passive liquidity suppliers to liquidity demanders, the group
that arguably includes informed investors demanding immediacy to extract rents from their in-
formation before their information becomes fully incorporated into prices (Harris (2003, p. 226)).
Throughout this paper, we use the terms “information asymmetry” and “informed trading” quite
interchangeably, with the choice depending on the economic context of where they are used.
Our first contribution is to test hypotheses on the systematic relationship between our two
information asymmetry measures and the market-wide factors that could be the most likely to
impound private information on economy-wide systematic return factors, and most likely to re-
flect the trading actions of skilled information processors aggregating public information across
stocks and sectors
2. We choose four factors: overall market volatility, aggregate trading volume
over all stocks, average bid-ask spread across stocks, and market-wide buy-sell order-imbalance;
and thereby investigate the extent of commonality in observed measures of informed trading.
2 For example, market-wide informed trading can arise as trading by large institutional investors acting in concert to
similar information, thereby generating similar order-flow. Information relevant to these investors may, for example,
be economic and monetary news and policy announcements. Additionally, Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) show that
new information on a small set of dominant firms in a particular industry may be used by investors to enhance their
information-set of related firms in the same industry, potentially causing the same trades across many stocks at once.
Some types of investors, e.g., hedge funds, may be particularly active in skilled processing of public information,
investing expertise and other resources without turnover or trading cost considerations, implementing strategies that
call for simultaneous trades of many stocks at the same time (See Malkiel and Saha (2005); Khandani and Lo (2007)).3
Our second contribution is to test hypotheses on the systematic relationship between our
two information asymmetry measures and firm-specific factors that could be the most likely to
impound firm-specific private information inferred by skilled information processors from pub-
licly available data. We choose six stock-level trading characteristics: volatility, trading volume,
actual and unexpected bid-ask spread, tick-size and buy-sell order-imbalance; and several infor-
mation-relevant firm-specific structural characteristics, e.g., size, asset tangibility, growth options,
insider and outsider ownership, and the availability of alternative trading mechanisms.
We then use the estimated systematic relationships between informed trading and com-
mon market-wide factors, and between informed trading and the structural and trading character-
istics of a firm, to calculate the “expected” level of informed trading (EXIT), and interpret EXIT
as a proxy for the asymmetric information content of skilled information processors who have
private information about systematic market-wide factors or who use public data to generate a
private informational advantage. We label the unexplained part of the observed level of informed
trading as Residual Asymmetric Information – or RAIN for brevity and ease of exposition. RAIN,
a measure that captures the aggregate net economic effect of the abnormal, unexpected level of
informed trading, is interpreted as a measure that represents truly private non-public information
that encapsulates within it (potentially informed) trades by traditional insiders. One can think of
our decomposition as conceptually creating three information based classes of traders: unin-
formed traders, skilled information processors without inside private information but with the ca-
pacity to generate a private informational advantage through private information on systematic
factors or with available public information, and informed traders with truly private information.
Our final contribution is to extend the empirical literature on information asymmetry and
cost of capital (e.g., Easley, et al. (2002)) and examine the extent to which the different compo-
nents of information asymmetry are priced in the cross-section of stock returns. The theoretical4
models relevant in this context are Easley and O'Hara (2004) (hereafter EO) and Hughes, et al.
(2007) (hereafter HLL); both of whom provide valuable insights for the central issue in this paper
even though our empirical framework, like others before, is not totally consistent with the rigid
structure of their models
3. The popular intuition is that information risk is priced because unin-
formed investors need to be compensated for the risk of systematically losing out to privately
more-informed investors; and more formally, EO show that firms with a higher fraction of pri-
vate (relative to public) information exposure have a higher required return. HLL, unlike EO, ex-
plicitly incorporate private information about systematic return factors, and, emphasizing diversi-
fication, argue that the pricing effect in EO Proposition 2 disappears in a large economy due to
diversification, and both informed and uninformed investors exploit liquidity traders in a noisy
supply environment. On one hand, HLL argue that, because of diversification, firm-specific in-
formation characteristics do not determine expected returns, and, on the other hand, they show
that factor risk premiums increase as information asymmetry about systematic factors increases;
and importantly, even though firm-level private signals arguably carry more information about
idiosyncratic rather than systematic factors, even infinitesimally tiny systematic factor informa-
tion has a finite effect on factor risk premiums when aggregated.
Based on EO, we would expect that RAIN, the informational advantage from fully private
non-public information, should clearly be priced in the required rate of return, but based on HLL,
we would expect the risk on this account to be fully diversified away: in fact, in an HLL world
one could argue that the results in Easley, et al. (2002) could potentially have been driven by
EXIT not RAIN, and the true test of EO will have to based on RAIN, and not on total information
asymmetry. To resolve this issue empirically, we test the return relevance of RAIN.
3 For example, while HLL are silent on an information asymmetry factor since it does not arise endogenously in
their model, they also say that their model is not inconsistent with its existence.5
The EO and HLL expectations are also different for the return relevance of EXIT, the pub-
lic-data-based private informational advantage of skilled information processors potentially with
private information on systematic factors. Based on HLL, private information on systematic mar-
ket-wide factors, and hence EXIT, should generate a positive risk premium. However, given that
EXIT is based on public data, and even the processing skills arguably extend across a wide spec-
trum of traders, one would not expect a positive risk premium for EXIT based on EO
4. Accord-
ingly, we distinguish between these modeling intuitions by exploring this issue empirically by
testing the return relevance of EXIT.
The empirical analysis of this paper is based on all reasonably liquid stocks traded on the
New York Stock Exchange (hereafter NYSE), and covering the eleven-year period between
January 1995 and December 2005. Our results on the relationships of information asymmetry
with market and firm factors are generally consistent with our ex-ante expectations. We find that
both information asymmetry measures have a strong and significant positive association with
market-wide and firm-level volatilities (consistent with French and Roll (1986)), market-wide
and firm-level trading volumes (consistent with Bhushan (1989a) and Admati and Pfleiderer
(1988)), market-wide and firm-level bid-ask spreads (consistent with Glosten and Milgrom
(1985)), and market-wide and firm-level order-imbalances (consistent with Kyle (1985)). Infor-
mation asymmetry is also significantly higher for firms with higher growth options (consistent
with Matsumoto (2002)), higher asset-tangibility (consistent with Cotter and Richardson (2002)
and Kothari et al. (2002)), greater insider ownership (consistent with Aboody, et al. (2005) and
Lakonishok and Lee (2001)), lower outsider ownership (consistent with an improvement in
4 In fact, in EO, as the fraction of traders with private information increases, the required rate of return decreases,
because the demand for the stock from informed traders increases and the precision with which information is re-
vealed to the uninformed increases. In our view, while private information in EO is idiosyncratic, even if we assume
that this idiosyncratic private information has a systematic component, these systematic components will be widely
dispersed, and hence reduce rather than increase required returns.6
communication with investors as in Bushee and Noe (2000)), less profitable firms, relatively
smaller firms (consistent with Bhushan (1989b) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001)), and firms with
options trading on it (consistent with Easley, et al. (1998)).
Overall, we find strong evidence of commonality in informed trading and the existence of
a core component in information asymmetry related to private information about systematic fac-
tors or skilled information analysts who, consistent with Kim and Verrecchia (1994, 1997), gen-
erate private information from public data. On average, about 47% of explained variation in in-
formed trading is attributable to market-wide commonality, with the remaining 53% attributable
to the firm-level environment captured by firm-specific structural characteristics and the stock-
level trading environment. As expected, we find that, consistent with sophisticated investors be-
ing more likely to invest in large firms (Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004); Farrar and Girton
(1981)), market-wide commonality in information asymmetry is significantly greater for larger
firms. We also find that, in the context of information asymmetry, stock-level trading characteris-
tics are relatively less important for larger firms, and, consistent with investors of smaller firms
having lesser public information (Bhushan (1989b)) and being exposed to greater risk because of
their less diverse operations (Agmon and Lessard (1997)), firm-level structural and individual
asset characteristics are relatively more important in explaining informed trading for smaller
firms.
Finally, we find that RAIN, the unpredictable component of information asymmetry that
represents truly private information, is priced in the asset’s required rate of return, and its effect
on pricing is stronger and more robust than that of total information asymmetry. At the same time,
EXIT, the predictable component that potentially represents the economic gain of skilled informa-
tion processors from “private” information on market-wide factors and other public information,
does not have a significantly positive risk premium. Our results strongly support the intuition in7
Easley and O’Hara (2004), and do not support the intuition in Hughes, et al. (2007), neither with
regard to the effects of diversification, nor with respect to the risk premium for systematic factors.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the hypotheses.
Section 3 presents the methodology. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 documents the em-
pirical results. And finally, Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
2. Hypotheses
2.1 Relationship of Information Asymmetry with Market and Firm Factors
Our first set of hypotheses relate to how information asymmetry, as measured by our two
proxies, varies systematically with different market and firm factors. For compactness of exposi-
tion, Table 1 lists the measures and variables whose relationship with information asymmetry we
investigate. The listing is under three sub-heads: market-wide factors, firm-specific trading char-
acteristics and firm-specific structural characteristics. Table 1 also briefly summarizes what we
believe the hypothesized relationship of each of these variables should arguably be with informed
trading, and the rationale for the hypothesized relationship, citing the relevant literature wherever
possible. Accordingly, on the basis of the arguments and the associated literature cited in Table 1,
the hypotheses we test are listed below.
Hypotheses H1 (Market-wide factors) - Information asymmetry is related:
H1A: Positively with market-wide bid-ask spread.
H1B: Positively with market-wide trading volume.
H1C: Positively with market-wide volatility.
H1D: Positively with market-wide order-balance.
Hypotheses H2 (Stock trading characteristics) - Information asymmetry is related:
H2A: Positively with stock bid-ask spread.
H2B: Positively with stock trading volume.
H2C: Positively with stock volatility.8
H2D: Positively with stock order-balance.
H2E: Positively with stock tick-size.
H2F: Positively with unexpected changes in stock bid-ask spreads.
Hypotheses H3 (Stock structural characteristics) - Information asymmetry is related:
H3A: Negatively with firm size.
H3B: Negatively with Book-to-Market Ratio (proxying for lack of growth options).
H3C: Negatively with firm profitability.
H3D: Negatively with ratio of R&D Expenses to sales (proxying for asset intangibility).
H3E: Positively with ratio of Capital Expenses to sales (proxying for asset tangibility).
H3F: Positively with insider ownership.
H3G: Negatively with outsider ownership.
H3H: Negatively with the existence of options trading on the stock.
2.2 Proportion of Informed Trading Explained by Public Information
In this context, we have three specific expectations. First, institutions are more likely to
be sophisticated investors and more likely to invest in large firms (Chordia and Subrahmanyam
(2004); Farrar and Girton (1981)), which, following the argument of the sophisticated investor
generating private-information from public data, implies that, those “informed” trades by institu-
tions that are based on skilled analysis of public data, should increase in relative importance with
firm size; and therefore, market-wide commonality in information asymmetry is likely to be rela-
tively greater for larger firms. Second, large-firm stocks are more liquid and price-efficient, and
should arguably provide less opportunities to informed traders to exploit their private informa-
tion; and hence, information asymmetry based on trading characteristics should be less important
to informed traders for relatively larger firms. And finally, since investors of smaller firms have
lesser public information (Bhushan (1989b)) and are exposed to greater risk because of their less
diverse operations (Agmon and Lessard (1997)), private information about firm-level structural9
and individual asset characteristics should be relatively more important in explaining informed
trading for smaller firms. Accordingly, we test the following hypotheses:
H4A: Market-wide commonality in informed trading is greater for larger stocks.
H4B: Informed trading driven by stock trading characteristics is less for larger stocks.
H4C: Informed trading driven by stock structural characteristics is less for larger stocks.
2.3 Price Relevance of Information Asymmetry
Referring to the discussion of this issue in the introduction, we note that EO predict an in-
formation risk premium based on the fraction of private (relative to public) information exposure.
HLL, unlike EO, argue that, because of diversification, firm-specific private information will not
generate a risk premium in the cross-section of expected returns. Hence, RAIN should be priced
based on EO but not on HLL. On the other hand, HLL show that factor risk premiums increase as
information asymmetry about systematic factors increases, and hence EXIT should generate a
positive risk premium based on HLL. However, since EXIT is based on publicly-available data,
one would not expect a positive risk premium for EXIT based on EO. In fact, one may even see
an EXIT-related reduction in required returns in EO. This is because, even if we assume that this
idiosyncratic private information in EO has a systematic component, these systematic compo-
nents will be widely dispersed, and EO predict that the required rate of return decreases as the
dispersion of private information across traders increases. Hence, our hypotheses on the price
relevance of information asymmetry are the following:
H5A: RAIN is a positively priced risk factor as per Easley & O’Hara (2004).
Alternative H5B: RAIN is not priced as per Hughes, et al. (2007).
H6A: EXIT is a positively priced risk factor as per Hughes, et al. (2007).
Alternative H6B: RAIN is not priced as per Easley and O’Hara (2004).10
3. Methodology
3.1 Measuring Informed Trading
We use two measures of informed trading: PIN (labeled PIN1 hereafter), and adverse selection
losses of liquidity suppliers to liquidity demanders (labeled IA1 hereafter). The PIN measure as-
sumes that investors are either informed or uninformed, and private information is revealed to the
informed investor at the beginning of each trading session; hence, informed trades reflect this
private information by being either exclusively buys or sales, but the trade direction of unin-
formed investors fluctuates randomly between buys and sells. The resulting daily number of buys
and sells serves as the empirical input enabling maximum likelihood estimates of the model, and
of PIN1over a set of T trading days. Empirical studies that use PIN1 (e.g., Easley, et al. (2002);
Odders-White and Ready (2006); Vega (2006) and others), show that the measure is well be-
haved and yields intuitive results. However, PIN1 is estimated over a large number of trading ses-
sions, and is relatively difficult to use for identifying short-lived changes in the information envi-
ronment. One could potentially estimate PIN1 is with higher frequency data, but there are well-
documented computational difficulties
5. In this paper, we use publicly available PIN1 data esti-
mated over a one-year horizon.
Our second measure of informed trading is the daily average adverse selection loss of li-
quidity suppliers to traders demanding liquidity. Assuming that informed investors demand im-
mediacy to extract rents from their information before their information becomes fully incorpo-
rated into prices, and that liquidity suppliers’ profits come not from private information but ex-
traction of rents from supplying immediacy (through a difference between bid and ask prices),
this loss should, on average, be zero in the absence of informed trading. IA1, this direct measure
5 These problems, documented by Easley, et al. (2008), Easley, et al. (2004), and Vega (2006), reflect a truncation
error that arises because the software used for maximum likelihood estimation reaches its numerical limit, and occur
when the number of transactions is high or when the imputed level of informed order flow is large relative to the
uninformed order flow.11
of adverse selection, provides transaction-level estimates of informed trading that can be aggre-
gated over any chosen frequency or class of traders. Daily averages of this variable are robust and
provide estimates at a sufficiently high frequency in the context of this paper. At a transaction
level, we define IA1 as
6:
  1, , t t T t t IA D M M M   (1)
where Dt is a trade direction indicator taking a value of +1 for a buy trade and –1 for a sell trade,
Mt and MT are the quote mid-points at the time of the transaction, t, and some time, T, later. To
account for variation in the time horizon that private new information is impounded into prices,
IA1 is estimated over 15 minutes, 30 minutes, 60 minutes, and over 24 hours (hereafter one day)
7.
The comparison of estimates of this information asymmetry variable with similarly defined vari-
ables used in previous studies and some simple time-series diagnostics show that IA1 values are
reasonable, intuitive and consistent
8.
3.2 Systematic Variation of Informed Trading
To capture variation of informed trading related to market-wide commonality, stock trading char-
acteristics, and firm structural characteristics, the level of informed trading is regressed on the set
of explanatory variables identified in the hypotheses section above. First, we estimate a single
regression with all variables together. Second, we divide the regression analysis into three parts,
examining how the step-wise removal of explained variance of informed trading due to market-
6 Following Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) and Naik and Yadav (2006), and slightly differently from Huang and
Stoll (1996) and Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997), we use quote mid-points rather than transaction prices to miti-
gate problems related to bid-ask bounce and unequally spaced transaction times (see, e.g., Lease, et. al (1991)).
7 Following Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997), we use quotes posted at least five seconds before the trade. Outliers
are handled by excluding the first half-hour of the trading day, IA1 observations larger than ten percent (Huang and
Stoll (1996)), and those eight standard deviations away from the daily stock-level average. In addition, the daily top
and bottom 0.1 percentiles are deleted to minimize the influence of extreme observations.
8 The 29.7 basis points reported by Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) for an equally-weighted average over 24
hours is close to our 22.8 basis points of the average IA1 calculated the same way. The values reported in Huang and
Stoll (1996) and Bessembinder (2003a, b) are also very similar if appropriate adjustments, such as dividing by the
average quote mid-point, are made.12
wide commonality, the stock-level trading environment, and the firm-specific structural charac-
teristics, affects excess returns. Both specifications provide similar results.
For the three-step analysis, informed trading alternatively captured by PIN1 or IA1, is first
regressed on the set of market-wide commonality variables and variation explained by these vari-
ables is subsequently removed. This procedure is repeated using stock-level trading characteris-
tics and firm-level structural characteristics until all the three sources of common variation of in-
formed trading are taken out of informed trading. Each regression has a firm-specific intercept
9.
Accordingly, the first regression, used to investigate the presence of common market-wide com-
ponents in informed trading, is specified as:
1, , ,0 1 2 3 4 , , i t i i t InfoTrade MBA MVOL MVLA MOIB             (2)
where InfoTrade1,i,t alternatively denotes PIN1 or IA1 of stock i on day t and the variables MBA,
MVOL, MVLA, and MOIB are the daily market-level bid-ask spread, dollar trading volume, vola-
tility, and order-imbalance, respectively. The market-wide component is subsequently taken out
of InfoTrade1,i,t by calculating InfoTrade2,i,t defined as:
  2, , 1, 1 2 3 4 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ . i t t InfoTrade InfoTrade MBA MVOL MVLA MOIB          (3)
InfoTrade2,i,t is subsequently related to firm-level variables. The relationship between stock-level
trading characteristics and informed trading is investigated by the following regression:
9 It appears reasonable to us to go from the general (market-wide variation) to the specific (stock-level trading or
structural characteristics), but otherwise, the order in which regressions (2) to (6) are estimated is arguably arbitrary.
In this context, we use step-wise regressions to empirically verify whether our order of the regressions corresponds
roughly to the explanatory power of the variables. We find that variables relating to market-wide and stock-level
trading characteristics always dominate, except that firm-size occasionally features as the third or fourth most impor-
tant variable. However, since stock-level trading variables are at least as important as market-wide trading variables
in explaining information asymmetry, we also, for robustness, run estimations in which we first regress on stock-
level trading characteristics, then on market-wide factors, and then on firm-level structural characteristics. The esti-
mated regression coefficients of these regressions are not qualitatively different from what we report in Table 5.13
2, , ,0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ,
5 , 6 , , ,
i t i i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
InfoTrade VLA BA OIB TIC
UEDSpread VOL
    
  
     
 
(4)
where VLA, BA, OIB, TIC, UEDSpread, and VOL are stock-level volatility, bid-ask spread, order-
imbalance, tick size, unexpected changes in the bid-ask spread, and trading volume, respectively.
Variation attributable to stock-level trading characteristics is taken out by calculating:


3, , 2, , 1 , 2 , 3 ,
4 , 5 , 6 ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ .
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t




    
 
(5)
InfoTrade3,i,t is used to investigate the relationship between structural characteristics and informa-
tion environment:
3, , ,0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ,
5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , , ,
i t i i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
InfoTrade Insider Outsider Capex R&D
BTM Profit Options Size
    
    
     
   
(6)
where Insider, Outsider, Capex, R&D, BTM, Profit, Options, and Size denote the fraction of
common stocks held by corporate insiders and outsiders, capital expenditures, R&D expenses,
the book to market ratio, the profit margin, and an indicator for the availability of exchange-
traded options on stock i. We calculate the Residual Asymmetric Information, RAIN, as:


, 3, , 1 , 2 , 3 ,
4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ,
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
RAIN InfoTrade Insider Outsider Capex
R&D BTM Profit Options Size
  
    
    
   
(7)
where RAINi,t denotes the unexplained residual part of informed trading of firm i on day t, and
represents the observed level of informed trading that deviates from what the public investor ex-
pects given the market environment, the stock-level trading environment, and features that char-
acterize each particular firm. As informed trades based on inside private information should not
show co-variation across stocks, RAIN is likely to capture informed trading that is associated with14
truly private information trades. Finally, we define EXIT as the difference between total informed
trading and RAIN.
A potential weakness of the three-step approach (relative to the one-step approach of put-
ting all variables into the same regression) is that the estimates may suffer from an omitted vari-
able bias, at least to a larger degree than if the regression was estimated including all explanatory
variables together
10. Hence, we also undertake all computations by relating informed trading to
its explanatory variables in one single regression. Such a single regression specification does not
enable examining how the step-wise incorporation or removal of explained variation of informed
trading affects excess returns, but does provide coefficient estimates, and their significance, for
each variable, and also provides an estimate of RAIN. We find that the single regression specifi-
cation used does not qualitatively affect the sign, magnitude, and significance of most of the es-
timated regression coefficients, and hence the resultant inferences.
4 Data
We use intra-day data from TAQ covering the eleven-year period from January 2, 1995 to De-
cember 30, 2005
11. Our sample is confined to stocks traded on the NYSE as primary market.
Daily time-weighted averages of the best bid and offer (hereafter BBO) quotes are calculated us-
ing NYSE data only, since data from regional exchanges can be unreliable for stocks that have
their primary listing on the NYSE (Odders-White and Ready (2006)). Trade direction is inferred
10 In view of the immediately preceding footnote, since the order in which the regressions are run corresponds
roughly to the empirical importance of the variables, the potential effects of omitted variable bias from estimating the
regression in three steps rather than one are very limited.
11 REITs, ADRs, ADSs, closed-end funds, convertibles, preference shares, multiple classes of shares, warrants, rights
issues, certificates, and stocks with less than 60 days of quotes or trades per calendar year, are excluded. Stocks trad-
ing below $1 are also excluded to ensure minimal liquidity and avoid undue influence of discrete prices. Trades at
market open, trades out of sequence, trades with special settlement conditions, trades outside market opening hours,
or corrected trades, are all purged, as are quotes posted during market open, negative quotes, or quotes that lead to a
bid-ask spread that is either negative, above $5, or larger than 40 percent of the transaction price. These “cleaning”
procedures are common for these data (see, e.g., Chordia, et al. (2000)).15
using the Lee and Ready (1991)-algorithm, and trades are matched with quotes posted at least
five seconds before the trade is executed
12.
Monthly and daily stock returns, closing stock prices, value-weighted market-returns, the
number of shares outstanding, four-digit SIC codes, and the daily share volume are retrieved
from CRSP. Using these data, stock-level volatility is based on the squared daily return, and tick
size is proxied by the inverse of the closing stock price. Dollar volume is the product of the clos-
ing stock price and share volume, and firm size is the daily product of the closing stock price and
the number of shares outstanding. The Fama and French (1995)-factors SMB and HML, and the
one-month Treasury bill rate, are from the Fama-French data-base on WRDS. The Blockholders
data of Dlugosz, et al. (2006) on WRDS is used to calculate corporate insider ownership as the
sum of the percentage of common stock held by executives, directors, and affiliated entities.
Ownership by corporate outsiders is defined as the fraction of common stock held by anyone who
is neither affiliated nor employed by the respective firm. Values of PIN1 were downloaded from
Soeren Hvidkjaer’s homepage
13. Data used to calculate profit margins, the ratios of book value to
market value, R&D expenses to sales, and capital expenditures to sales, are from COMPUSTAT,
where COMPUSTAT data are winsorized at the first top and bottom percentile
14.
Order-imbalance is defined as the sum of the intercept and the residual of a regression of
the ratio of absolute daily raw dollar imbalance to daily dollar volume on dollar trading volume.
The volume data that are further used in the empirical analysis are defined as the residuals of a
12 The Lee and Ready (1991)-algorithm may be potentially correlated with the error of IA1 used to measure informed
trading, but remains the most robust and popular way to infer trade-direction. See e.g., Ellis, et. al (2000) for a dis-
cussion of commonly used trade-direction algorithms.
13 We thank Soeren Hvidkjaer on our acknowledgements page for making the PIN1 data available on his website.
14 These variables are operating profits (item 13), total sales (item 12), the necessary items to calculate book value
excluding preference shares (items 60, 74, and 208 less items 56, 175, and 130), R&D expenses (item 46), and capi-
tal expenditures (item 128). Firms with negative book values are excluded. Missing values from COMPUSTAT and
the Blockholders database are set to zero. Results are insensitive to these data cleaning procedures.16
regression of changes in dollar volume on market volume, stock-level volatility, and market re-
turns (Chordia, et al. (2000) follows a similar set-up):
2
0 1 2 1 3 , 4 , 1 5 , $ , t t t m t m t i t t Volume MVolme MVolume r r r                 (8)
where $Volumet is the percentage change in dollar volume from the previous trading day to day t,
rm,t and ri,t are the return on the market and on stock i over the same period, and MVolumet is the
equally-weighted market average of stock-level percentage changes in dollar volume from the
previous day to day t. Defining volume in this way improves the comparability of volume across
stocks and removes the time-trend in dollar volume. Similarly, regression (8) is estimated by re-
placing Volume and MVolume by the daily percentage changes in bid-ask percentage spreads and
the market average of changes therein. The residual of this regression is UEDSpread, and repre-
sents the unexpected change in bid-ask spreads, our proxy for large changes in bid-ask spreads
15.
Market-level bid-ask spread, trading volume, and order-imbalance are defined as value-
weighted averages of the stock-level values. The new methodology VIX index is used to measure
market-volatility
16. The merged data set contains 2,407 individual firms that have valid observa-
tions for all data-items, with different years having between 1,287 and 1,641 individual firms.
For ready reference, Table 2 summarizes the definitions of the empirical measurements
used in this study. Summary statistics of the data are shown in Table 3. The mean book-to-market
ratio is very close to that documented by, for example, Easley, et al. (2002). It is important to
note that most variables exhibit significant skewness and a strong size-effect. The value-weighted
market average of bid-ask spreads, for instance, is much smaller than the simple mean of the
stock-level equivalent, showing that small firms have a much larger bid-ask spread than large
15 The estimated coefficients of this regression are very close to what Chordia, et. al (2000) report with and without a
lead-term. Intercepts are insignificant (average p-values 0.23 and 0.38 for volume and bid-ask spread respectively).
16 The new methodology VIX index is downloaded from the CBOE website. Based on a portfolio of options on the
S&P 500 index, it provides an ex ante forecast of expected future volatility, and is best suited to our intention of cap-
turing the markets’ information environment, clearly preferable to backward looking past realizations of volatility.17
firms. Accordingly, as is common in empirical market microstructure, we rescale input data to
improve their distributional characteristics, and to make cross-sectional comparisons more mean-
ingful (Naik and Yadav (2003))
17. We rescale in two ways: by standardizing parametrically to a
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one, as in Hansch, et al. (1999) and Brennan, et al.
(1998); and rescaling non-parametrically, as in Llorente, et al. (2001)) but through the method of
normal scores by replacing the variable value by its ranking scaled by a factor that fits a unit
normal distribution to the data. Our results are not sensitive to the choice of rescaling. Our re-
ported results are based on non-parametric rescaling, since it is explicitly free from any postu-
lated relationship between informed trading and the explanatory variables. Variables capturing
market-wide commonality, stock-level trading characteristics, and firm-specific structural charac-
teristics are rescaled within each time-series individually, and the time-specific structural vari-
ables are rescaled daily across the cross-section.
5 Discussion of Results
5.1 Univariate Analysis
The correlation matrix in Table 4 provides the first picture of the co-variation between informed
trading and our set of explanatory variables. All values are statistically significant. Virtually all
our hypotheses in the H1, H2, and H3 groups are supported even in simple univariate analyses.
There are just two variables – market trading volume and book-to-market ratio - for which the
relationship is in a direction opposite to the corresponding hypothesis for both PIN1 and IA1; and
there are just two variables – market volatility and unexpected bid-ask spread – for which the re-
lationship of PIN1 with the explanatory variables is different from that of IA1.Overall, both meas-
ures of informed trading appear to be capturing the same underlying economic phenomenon.
17 Taking logarithms instead of rescaling is also common, but requires the data to be strictly positive, and addition-
ally implies an exponential relationship between information asymmetry and the explanatory variables that cannot be
motivated a priori in the current context.18
5.2 Multivariate Analysis
Using the methodological set-up outlined in the methodology section, IA1and PIN1 are regressed
separately on our set of explanatory variables. Comparability in the estimated relationships of IA1
and PIN1 with our explanatory variables can serve as a consistency check to verify that both vari-
ables are capturing the same underlying economic phenomenon. To ensure such comparability,
daily IA1 is first expressed as a yearly average since PIN1 is available only at a yearly frequency.
The results in Table 5 are accordingly based on yearly estimates of each of the variables involved.
Panel A reports results from a one-step decomposition, while Panels B and C report a three-step
decomposition. The IA1 regressions are estimated over 15, 30, and 60 minutes, and 24 hours, but,
since the results are very similar, we only present results for the 60 minutes horizon in Panel C.
Overall, we find that our results are largely consistent, whether we use one-step decomposition
(Panel A) or three-step decomposition (Panels B and C), and whether we use PIN1 (Panels A and
B) or IA1 (Panels A and C).
5.2.1 Market-wide Factors and Commonality in Informed Trading
The results in Table 5 show that the hypotheses in the H1 group are strongly and significantly
supported for market-wide spread, market-wide order-imbalance; and particularly for IA1, also for
market-wide volatility. Higher levels of informed trading are related to significantly higher mar-
ket-wide bid-ask spreads (consistent with Glosten and Milgrom (1985)), significantly higher
market-wide order-imbalances (consistent with Kyle (1985)), and significantly higher market
volatility (consistent with French and Roll (1986)); and each of these is also consistent with the
corresponding univariate results. The association with market volume is significantly negative for
PIN1 and significantly positive for IA1. The significantly positive relation of volume with IA1 is
consistent with Bhushan (1989a) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), and hence, hypothesis H1B.19
Irrespective, our results show a strong degree of commonality in informed trading, and
imply that a significant proportion of the observed level of informed trading is related to public,
market-wide signals. These results are consistent with private information on systematic factors,
and with the information analysts in Kim and Verrecchia (1994, 1997) who generate private in-
formation, and consequently undertake informed trading, by interpreting publicly available data
quicker and more effectively than the marginal investor; and also support the Hasbrouck and
Seppi (2001) argument that commonality in trading may be caused by informed investors acting
on the same market-wide information.
5.2.2 Stock-level Trading Environment
In the second step, a modified informed trading variable that has been duly purged of market-
wide variables, is regressed on stock-level trading characteristics. The results in this context in
Table 5 are again consistent with the univariate results. All hypotheses in the H2 group are
strongly and significantly supported except that hypothesis H2F relating to unexpected bid-ask
spreads is strongly and significantly supported only for IA1 but not for PIN1. Higher levels of
firm-level volatility and firm-level bid-ask spreads are both associated with significantly higher
levels of informed trading, consistent with French and Roll (1986) and Glosten and Milgrom
(1985) respectively. Higher volume is also associated with significantly greater informed trading,
consistent with Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and the empirical findings of Bhushan (1989a) and
Llorente, et al. (2001). The positive coefficient of tick size implies that there is less information
asymmetry when the tick-size is smaller, and this is consistent with prices converging faster to
fundamental values when tick size is smaller, similar to the improvement in price efficiency ob-
served by Chordia, et al. (2005) when NYSE switched to decimal pricing. Greater order imbal-
ance is associated with significantly greater informed trading, and the stronger association of20
PIN1 with order-imbalance (relative to IA1) likely reflects the fact that PIN1 estimation is more
directly based on order-imbalance.
The relationship of unexpected changes in bid-ask spreads with informed trading meas-
ured by PIN1 is opposite to that measured by IA1. This may potentially reflect estimation-related
issues. PIN1 values are estimated by aggregating data over a full year, and can therefore pick up
long-term effects; for example, the strategic cost-minimizing trading behavior of informed traders
(as in Kyle (1985)) generated by informed trading being lower when spreads are unexpectedly
high. IA1, by contrast, is estimated over a much shorter horizon, and is likely to pick up the short-
term relationship between bid-ask spreads and informed trading that is also found in the univari-
ate setting, i.e., that higher informed trading causes market makers to widen bid-ask spreads
(Glosten and Milgrom (1985)).
5.2.3 Firm-specific Structural Characteristics
In the third step, a modified informed trading variable that has been purged of both market-wide
variables and stock-level trading characteristics, is regressed on firm-specific structural character-
istics. The results, reported in Table 5, again confirm virtually all the findings from the univariate
analysis and, after taking into account all the Panels, provide reasonable support to all the hy-
potheses in the H3 group. Consistent with Bhushan (1989b) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001), in-
formed-trading declines significantly with firm size as anticipated. Informed trading also in-
creases significantly as the relative size of the ownership stake of insiders increases, consistent
with corporate insiders exploiting their informational advantage (Aboody, et al. (2005); Lakon-
ishok and Lee (2001)). However, outsiders significantly reduce information asymmetry and im-
prove the information environment, in line with the findings of Bushee and Noe (2000) and not
consistent with Maug (2002). The significantly negative sign of the coefficient of the book-to-
market ratio (for PIN1 and for 15-minute IA1) is now opposite to that for the univariate results,21
and supports hypothesis H3B that growth firms expose investors to greater informed trading, con-
sistent with Matsumoto (2002), who find that growth firms bias the information communicated to
the public more than others. Interestingly, more profitable firms also have significantly less in-
formed trading consistent with uninformed investors flocking to profitable companies, leaving
less profitable companies with relatively greater informed trading. We continue to find a negative
association between informed trading and R&D expenses, and a positive association with capital
expenses over sales, indicating that informed traders focus on firms with greater asset tangibility,
consistent with intangible assets being difficult to value (Cotter and Richardson (2002) and with
uncertain economic benefit (Kothari, et al. (2002)). Finally, the availability of options is associ-
ated with a lower level of informed trading: this is consistent with Easley, et al. (1998), and with
informed traders preferring to trade in the options market, and consequently, uninformed inves-
tors in the market for stocks with options being less exposed to informed trades than investors in
comparable stocks without options.
Richer analysis of the potential determinants of the time-series variation in informed trad-
ing needs higher frequency measurement of the informed trading variable. We accordingly next
investigate daily variation in informed trading levels. Since PIN1 is available only at a yearly fre-
quency, this daily analysis has to be undertaken using only IA1 data. However, we note that, in
Table 5, both measures of informed trading - PIN1 and IA1 - show very similar associations with
our set of explanatory variables, and hence, conditional on the occasional estimation-related
specificity highlighted above, appear to be capturing the same underlying economic phenomenon.
Hence, we are perfectly comfortable with drawing general conclusions about informed trading
from the IA1–based analysis that follows.22
5.3 Daily Analysis of Informed Trading
This section reports the results of re-estimating the regressions specified in the methodology sec-
tion at daily frequency, and to account for the strong size effect in the data, the regressions are
estimated individually by firm size deciles. The results are presented in Table 6. As before, we
report only results based on IA1 estimated over 60 minutes, since the results for IA1 estimated
over different intraday horizons, or over 24 hours, are very similar.
The sign of the regression coefficients capturing the relationship between informed trad-
ing and market-wide commonality on a daily level are completely consistent with what we found
using yearly data (Panel A of Table 6), but the use of daily data enables us to also make other in-
ferences. In relation to market-wide commonality in daily informed trading, we note that the
magnitude of the influence of market-level bid-ask spread, market-level volume, and market-
wide volatility on firm-level informed trading decreases monotonically in firm size. Since we are
conditioning here on market-wide variables separately for each size decile, we are capturing time-
series (rather than cross-sectional) innovations in these variables; and each of these variables is
related to the information environment: liquidity suppliers increase spreads on days with greater
information asymmetry, higher volume days correspond to days when the rate of information
flow is arguably greater, and higher volatility days are days on which a greater quantum of in-
formation gets incorporated into prices. Our IA1 results imply that, for a given rate of market-
wide information flow, market-wide magnitude of information, and overall information asymme-
try, the trade-conditioned return of (potentially informed) liquidity demanders is greater for
smaller firms relative to larger firms; and this is consistent with Kim and Verrechia (1994, 1997)
skilled information processors being able to analyze market-wide data to extract greater informa-
tional rents for relatively smaller companies that have correspondingly lower analyst following.
On the other hand, the size of the regression coefficients of market-level order-imbalance de-23
crease in firm size, reflecting the lower contemporaneous correlation of market-level changes
with firm-level changes for relatively smaller firms, since such smaller, less actively traded
stocks need relatively more time to fully incorporate the new information contained in market-
wide changes in order-imbalance (Hasbrouck (1991)) since sophisticated skilled information
processors are arguably likely to be institutional investors (Lee, et al. (1991)) and focus preferen-
tially on larger firms (Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004); Farrar and Girton (1981)). The de-
layed response does not affect the contemporaneous dependence of volatility, volume and spreads
to the same extent since these variables exhibit strong time-series persistence, while, on the other
hand, the order imbalance variable is mean-reverting.
The dependence of daily informed trading on stock-level trading characteristics is com-
pletely consistent with the results based on yearly averages, except for the result relating to tick-
size. The inconsistency in the tick-size results is perhaps not surprising since our size-conditioned
results in Table 6 essentially represent the effect of time-series variation for the same stock,
rather than the cross-sectional variation across stocks captured by yearly data analyses. For yearly
data, i.e. essentially across the cross-section, relative tick size captures differences in the effi-
ciency with which information was incorporated into prices, but it is not clear what time-series
differences in (the inverse of) price levels for the same stock proxy for. That said, we note that
the smallest decile shows a relationship opposite to the rest of the sample, consistent with the
finding of Kairys, et al. (2000) that the quality of the price-discovery process deteriorates for the
least liquid stocks as the trading process becomes more efficient through a switch from a daily
batch auction to continuous pricing.
Use of the daily informed trading variable again enables us to make inferences across size
deciles. The influence of firm-level bid-ask spread, firm-level volume, and firm-level order-
imbalance on informed trading decreases monotonically in firm size. Again, our IA1 results imply24
that, for a given rate of firm-specific information flow, firm-specific information captured by or-
der-imbalance, and firm-specific information asymmetry, the trade-conditioned return of (firm-
level informed) liquidity demanders is greater for smaller firms relative to larger firms; and this is
consistent with Lakonishok and Lee (2001), who find that private information about firm-level
issues is greatest for the smallest stocks. However, the coefficient for firm-level volatility does
not vary significantly across firm-size.
Since many of the firm-specific structural variables are observed only on an annual fre-
quency, we consider the relationships between daily informed trading and firm-specific structural
characteristics documented in Table 6 Panel C to be indicative rather than definitive. That said, it
is clear that, as with yearly data, informed trading is much greater for relatively smaller stocks;
firm profit margins are lower for firms with greater informed trading; and the options availability
indicator is significant only for larger firms. Outside ownership, which on a yearly frequency is
associated with a lower level of informed trading, now shows the opposite relationship. This is
consistent with the empirical findings by Yan and Zhang (2007), who find that “short-term insti-
tutions” exploit their information advantage whereas “long-term” institutions do not. The results
using yearly IA1 may therefore pick up the relationship between informed trading and long-
horizon investors and the relationship found for daily IA1likely captures the relationship between
informed trading and short-horizon investors.
5.4 Analysis of Explained and Unexplained Informed Trading
To test the H4 group of hypotheses, we calculate how much of the explained variation in informa-
tion asymmetry corresponds to market-wide commonality, stock trading characteristics, and firm
structural characteristics; and whether the relative proportions depend on the features of the firm.
Table 7 shows the results of decomposing the relative explanatory power of market-wide
variables, firm-specific trading characteristics, and firm-specific structural characteristics for dif-25
ferent size deciles as per the regression specifications outlined in the explanatory notes to the ta-
ble. On average, about 47% of explained variation of informed trading is associated with the
market-wide component, about 46% is attributable to the stock-level trading environment, and
about 7% of explained variation is attributable to firm-specific structural characteristics. Thus,
almost half the explained variation of informed trading is related to market-wide commonality
and factors other than firm-specific characteristics. This is an interesting finding given that em-
pirical studies typically consider informed trading to be a firm-specific phenomenon. Alternative
specifications do not change the results qualitatively. Estimating the regression across the entire
data panel by firm-size decile, market-wide factors capture between 14% (Decile 1) and 65%
(Decile 10) of the explained variance, and stock-level trading characteristics account for between
55% (Decile 1) and 19% (Decile 10). Importantly, ranking the relative explanatory power by
other characteristics such as the book-to-market ratio or spreads does not show any significant
variation in relative explanatory power across ranks, and is hence not reported.
Importantly, each of the hypotheses H4A, H4B, and H4C are strongly supported. Market-
wide commonality in information asymmetry is relatively greater for larger firms; information
asymmetry based on trading characteristics is less important for relatively larger firms; and unex-
plained variation of informed trading becomes more important as we move from larger to smaller
firms, reflecting the importance of private information in smaller firms (Lakonishok and Lee
(2001)) where investors have lesser public information (Bhushan (1989b)) and are exposed to
greater risk because of their less diverse operations (Agmon and Lessard (1997)).
5.5 Informed Trading and Stock Returns
This section tests the H5 and the H6 group of hypotheses, i.e., whether RAIN and EXIT are posi-
tively priced risk factors, and hence whether the Easley and O’Hara (2004) model or the Hughes,26
et al. (2007) model is supported by the data. We test the relationship between returns and in-
formed trading in the cross-section by using a Fama and MacBeth (1973) set-up. The time-period
covered by the data includes the period after 2000, which is characterized by a prolonged period
of negative market returns. According to Potential and Sundaram (1995), negative excess market
returns make the estimated loading on the beta-coefficient insignificant unless negative and posi-
tive market returns are separately considered in the cross-sectional regression. For this purpose,
up-market (down-market) market betas are defined as being equal to the stock-level beta if the
realized market return in excess of the risk-free rate is positive (negative) and zero otherwise. To
implement the regression, fifty portfolios are formed based on the average level of informed trad-
ing of the previous month. Stock returns in excess of the risk-free rate are averaged within each
portfolio and regressed on the portfolio averages of beta, the logarithm of the book-to-market ra-
tio, and the logarithm of firm size. The book-to-market ratio, firm size, and beta are measured as
of the previous year. The relevant value of informed trading is the level during the previous cal-
endar year if PIN1 is used and the average level during the previous month if IA1 is used as meas-
ure of informed trading. This results in the following regression that is estimated every month:
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where
e
p R is the average portfolio return in excess of the risk-free rate of portfolio p. The vari-
ables BETAup,p and BETAdown,p are up-market and down-market betas of portfolio p, Sizep is the
logarithm of firm size of portfolio p, and BTMp is the logarithm of the book-to-market ratio of
portfolio p. InfoTradek,p refers to the average level of informed trading-measure k of portfolio p.
The monthly effective spread is used as an alternative to InfoTradek to verify whether the rela-
tionship between informed trading and stock returns does not pick up liquidity effects that, as
Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) find, may also be priced. Our results are presented in Table 827
using Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979)-adjusted t-statistics, a weighed least square estimate
using the parameter precision as weight. Our results are robust to the choice of the horizon over
which IA1 is estimated.
Intercepts are sometimes insignificant, and the model specified in regression (9) captures
cross-sectional returns fairly well. Firm size is hardly significant though the negative regression
coefficients reveal the size effect in stock returns, discussed in Fama and French (1992). The lack
of statistical significance reflects the results of Kim (1995), who also finds firm size to be of little
importance in explaining cross-sectional returns if data covering more recent time periods are
used. The inclusion of the up-market and down-market betas turns out to be useful as the load-
ings are significant and signed, as Potential and Sundaram (1995) suggest, while the (unreported)
use of one single beta variable leads to insignificant coefficients. Consistent with Easley, et al.
(2002), the total unadjusted level of informed trading is priced in the cross-section. Most impor-
tantly, however, the association between excess returns and information risk gets economically
and statistically stronger as one moves from total information asymmetry to RAIN. This relation-
ship weakens, however, the longer the horizon IA1 is estimated over. Loadings on EXIT are not
statistically significant. The result is robust to whether RAIN is estimated in three steps as out-
lined in equations (2) to (7) or whether it is estimated in one go (referred to as RAIN2 in Table 8).
To further reinforce these results, and to give more weight to the time-series relationship
between returns and informed trading, a second asset-pricing test is conducted. Cochrane (2001)
discusses the trade-off between the empirical robustness of ordinarily least-squares and the statis-
tical efficiency of generalized least-squares (henceforth referred to as GLS) in asset pricing. Test-
ing the return relevance of the components of the information environment in a GLS framework
potentially improves the validity of the results, as it is the most efficient way to adjust Fama-
MacBeth regressions for biases and the errors-in-variables problem (Ferson and Harvey (1999)).28
Following Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), we use a random intercept GLS regression model.
In particular, we use a three-way sort on size, book-to-market, and informed trading. Equally-
weighted average portfolio excess returns are regressed on market returns in excess of the risk-
free rate, the Fama and French (1993)-factors SMB and HML, and the rank of each portfolio
based on its level of informed trading. The GLS regressions are run on the full data panel,
whereby every portfolio has individual factor loadings for the market factor, the HML factor, and
the SMB factor. The coefficient on the level of informed trading, however, is estimated across all
portfolios. This procedure results in a large number of explanatory variables, which therefore ne-
cessitates adequate time-series observations for a statistically valid estimation. The low sampling
frequency of PIN1 results in relatively few time-series observations of this variable. Therefore,
this particular asset-pricing test is done using only the monthly observations of IA1.
The slope coefficients of RAIN in Table 9 again show that it is a positive and significant
priced factor. In addition, the loadings on the ranking variable mostly increase in economic terms
as one successively removes market-wide commonality, stock-level trading characteristics, and
firm-specific structural characteristics of informed trading. And once again, EXIT is not related to
returns, confirming the associations of the cross-sectional set-up presented in Table 8.
Finally, we do a robustness test to see whether RAIN really constitutes a true residual as is
claimed in the analysis. For this purpose, we do a principal component analysis on the complete
set of stock-level RAIN series
18. If RAIN truly represents a residual, one would expect not to find
a principal component that captures significant variance across individual stocks. PIN1 has too
few time-series observations to qualify for this test, which is why this test is only conducted us-
ing IA1. Our results, shown in Table 10, do reasonably confirm our residual characterization for
18 To ensure a sufficiently large time-series, only stocks that have observations at least 97.5 percent of time during
the sample period are used.29
RAIN. The first principal component does not capture more than 7 percent of the observed vari-
ance and the first three principal components together capture less than 12 percent of the ob-
served variance. Thus, RAIN seems to be mainly driven by firm-specific events and the filtering
approach in the paper appears to have been reasonably successful in removing commonality in
variation across stocks.
Overall, our results show, quite unequivocally, that RAIN, the unpredictable component of
information asymmetry that represents truly private information, is priced in the asset’s required
rate of return, and its effect on pricing is stronger and more robust than that of total information
asymmetry. At the same time, EXIT, the predictable component that potentially represents the
economic gain of skilled information processors from “private” information on market-wide fac-
tors and other public information, does not have a significantly positive risk premium. Accord-
ingly, our results support Easley and O’Hara (2004), and do not support Hughes, et al. (2007).
5.6 Other Robustness Checks
We have highlighted several robustness checks in our discussion of empirical results in the pre-
ceding sub-sections. In this sub-section, we further highlight other robustness checks we do to
further test the validity of our results. First, regressions (2) to (6) on daily IA1 data are re-
estimated within firm size quintiles and including day-of-the-week dummies. Using firm size
quintiles instead of deciles results in the same sign of the associations between the set of explana-
tory variables and informed trading. While the inclusion of day-of-the-week dummies does not
affect the sign or significance of the other explanatory variables, informed trading appears to be
higher at the beginning of the week. The Chordia, et al. (2002) finding that the highest level of
trading activity is at the beginning of the week, is true also for informed-trading.
Second, as informed trading is proxied by order-imbalance in many theories about the in-
formation flow in financial markets (e.g., Easley, et al. (2002); Kyle (1985); Lyons (2001)), sev-30
eral alternative specifications of order-imbalance are tested (in addition to that used in the tables
above): specifically, lagged order-imbalance, dummies that account for the sign of order imbal-
ance, and dummies that classify each daily stock-level order-imbalance observation into deciles.
Our results are not qualitatively different
19. We also do the analysis also by conditioning on trade
direction. The average information content of order-imbalance seems to differ by trade direction.
Buying pressure tends to be positively related to informed-trading, while selling pressure is re-
lated to a lower level of informed trading. According to Aboody, et al. (2005) and Lakonishok
and Lee (2001), this asymmetry could be due to buys involving a deliberate choice, potentially
based on private information; while sales also contain liquidity trades by employees that intend to
divest stocks that are part of their compensation package (Aboody, et al. (2005); Lakonishok and
Lee (2001)). Consistent with theory (e.g., Kyle (1985)), the size of the daily order-imbalance po-
sition has a positive relationship with the level of informed trading.
Third, to investigate the stability of the coefficient estimates, regressions (2) to (6) are re-
estimated within sub-periods of the sample by slicing the time-series into two, three, and four
partitions. Running the regression in different sub-periods shows estimates largely consistent
with Table 6. However, regression coefficients of market-level volatility are mostly negative be-
tween 1995 and 1997 as are the coefficients of stock-level bid-ask spreads for the regressions es-
timated between 2003 and 2005. Both variables exhibit a consistent time-trend during these sub-
periods, which the sub-period regression estimates seem to pick-up.
Fourth, noting that IA1 is a measure of a fixed-interval return conditional on a trade, we
test whether IA1 does actually captures the level of informed trading rather than simply proxy for
19 A noteworthy result is that the order-imbalance variable lagged by one day is positively related to informed trading
if IA1 is estimated over horizons shorter than one day. The coefficient of lagged order-imbalance is negative for lar-
ger firms and positive but insignificant for smaller ones if IA1 is estimated over one day. This suggests that the in-
formation contained in order-imbalance is impounded into prices within about one day.31
daily unconditional returns. Thus, we construct a return measure that is otherwise identical but
excludes the information contained in the timing of a transaction. In particular, we assume that a
hypothetical trader observes the daily realization of the explanatory variables. If this realization
deviates from the historical (or cross-sectional) average, the trader takes a position of unit size
that has the same direction as the deviation of the explanatory variable from its mean value and
keeps this position for one day. Alternatively, the amplitude of the deviation from the historical
or cross-sectional average is also made to reflect in the size of the position. The resulting stock-
level return-series is subsequently regressed on the explanatory variables using the same method-
ology and sectioning into size groups. Regardless of how this alterative return series is specified,
the explanatory power of the regressions remains very low (the R-square is between 0.004 and
0.022). The associations with the explanatory variables are also usually insignificant.
Finally, in the same spirit, another concern related to the use of IA1 is how strongly IA1 is
influenced by return momentum. Therefore a time-series of daily 15-minutes unconditional quote
returns is constructed. This return variable has the same set-up as IA1 except for explicitly not ac-
counting for the information content of the timing of a trade. This variable should therefore me-
chanically pick up return momentum. If the relationship between this quote-return variable and
the set of explanatory variables is weaker than what is found for IA1, one could conclude that IA1
contains more information than simply daily returns. We again find extremely low explanatory
power (the average R-square across all size deciles is 3.2 percent). In addition, the signs and the
significance of some explanatory variables are not consistent across size decile. These tests show
that IA1 cannot be replicated either using environmental variables observed in the recent past or
mechanically by supplying returns over fixed intervals. Therefore, we believe that IA1 does re-
flect private economic information that arguably gets transmitted to the market by means of in-
formed trades.32
6 Summary and Conclusions
This paper analyses informed trading in about 1,500 reasonably liquid stocks traded on the NYSE
between January 1995 and December 2005. Our first major contribution is to investigate and test
hypotheses on the relationship between informed trading and market-wide commonality, stock-
level trading characteristics, and firm-specific structural characteristics. We find strong support
for virtually all of our hypotheses. We find that the relationships between our microstructure-
based informed-trading measures, and our set of explanatory variables, are consistent with eco-
nomic theory, intuition, and, where available, prior theory and empirical evidence obtained using
other measures and other empirical approaches.
Our results demonstrate strong market-wide commonality in informed trading with mar-
ket-level volatility, trading volume, bid-ask spreads, and order-imbalance all significantly related
to the level of informed trading; and strong evidence of association between individual firm-
specific factors and informed trading. On average, almost half of the observed informed trading
can be attributed to commonality, and relatively more so for larger firms. Our results are consis-
tent with Kim and Verrecchia (1994, 1997) type skilled information analysts generating “private”
information from public data, and potentially private information on systematic factors.
Given the estimated systematic relationships between informed trading and common mar-
ket-wide and firm-specific factors, we calculate the “expected” level of informed trading (EXIT),
and interpret EXIT as a proxy for the asymmetric information content of skilled information
processors who have private information about systematic market-wide factors or who use public
data to generate a private informational advantage. We label the unexplained part of the observed
level of informed trading as Residual Asymmetric Information – or RAIN, and interpret RAIN as a33
measure that represents truly private non-public information encapsulating, for example, trades
by traditional insiders.
Finally, we test whether RAIN and EXIT are priced information factors, and find that
RAIN is a significant priced information factor, but EXIT is not. The Easley and O’Hara (2004)
and Hughes, et al. (2007) models have opposite implications for both RAIN and EXIT; and both
our results provide strong support for Easley and O’Hara (2004) but not for Hughes, et al. (2007).
We recognize that we use measures of informed-trading that are not only potentially noisy,
but also fairly different in their perspective, underlying assumptions, and even sampling fre-
quency. However, the consistency of our results across such different measures generates more
confidence in the conclusions. We also recognize that eleven years of data may be a fairly short
time horizon from an asset pricing point of view. But once again, the strength and consistency of
the results across different specifications, and across our extensive robustness checks, generate
confidence that the results are sufficiently robust to provide useful insights into the nature and the
pricing relevance of information asymmetry.34
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Table 1 – Hypothesized Relationship of Variables with Informed Trading
This table shows the hypothesized relationships between our explanatory variables and informed trading. The columns “Measure” and “Variable Name” indicate the
explanatory variables. The columns “Sign” and “Hypothesis” list respectively the expected sign of the relationship of the variable with informed trading, and the rationale
for the hypothesis based on the literature. The symbols “+” and “–” in the column Sign indicate that increases in the particular variable are expected to be related to a
higher or lower level of informed trading, respectively.
Measure Variable Name Rationale for Relationship Sign
Market-wide
commonality
Bid-ask spread MBA Bid-ask spreads are higher the higher the level of informed trades (Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). +
Trading volume MVOL Higher trading volume should lead to more informed trades: first, because the resulting more noisy prices increase the relative advantage
of private information (Bhushan (1989a)); second, because informed traders hide among liquidity traders (Admati and Pfleiderer (1988));
and third, because the higher trading volume could be arising from greater information flow.
+
Volatility MVLA Private information drives returns’ volatility (French and Roll (1986)). +
Order imbalance MOIB Private information is expressed via order-imbalance (Kyle (1985)). +





UEDSpread If informed trading is unexpectedly high because of some exogenous factors, market makers increase spreads to protect themselves from
losses (Glosten and Milgrom (1985)). That said, as bid-ask spreads unexpectedly increase, there is an unanticipated drop in liquidity, and
the number of informed trades decreases since informed traders are strategic (Kyle (1985)).
+
Trading volume VOL Higher trading volume should lead to more informed trades: first, because the resulting more noisy prices increase the relative advantage
of private information (Bhushan (1989a)); second, because informed traders hide among liquidity traders (Admati and Pfleiderer (1988));
and third, because the higher trading volume could be arising from greater information flow.
+
Tick size TIC When tick size is lower, prices converge quicker to fundamental values and become more “efficient” (Chordia, et al. (2005)), and hence,
relatively more information is impounded into prices over a given time interval, which should arguably result in a higher observed level of
the informed trading variable.
–
Order imbalance OIB Private information is expressed via order-imbalance (Kyle (1985)). +
Public exposure Size Public investors in large firms have more sources of information that get more frequently updated than investors of smaller firms










Small firms with growth options (i.e., a lower book-to-market ratio, or BTM) bias investor communication to a greater extent (Matsumoto
(2002)). If public information is biased, informed investors are advantaged. Therefore, growth options are positively associated with in-
formed trading.
Uninformed investors flock to profitable companies, implying that less profitable companies have relatively greater informed trading.
R&D – Asset tangibility
Capex
Intangibles are difficult to value for outsiders (Cotter and Richardson (2002)) and their economic benefits are more uncertain (Kothari, et
al. (2002)). Therefore, higher asset tangibility, as measured by the ratio of R&D-expenses to sales and capital expenses over sales, or
Capex, should be associated with a higher level of informed trading.
+
Insider + Ownership structure
Outsider
Corporate insiders exploit their information advantage (Aboody, et al. (2005); Lakonishok and Lee (2001)).
Outside ownership by institutional investors should be associated with better investor communication (Bushee and Noe (2000)), decreas-
ing information asymmetry. That said, it is alternatively conceivable that outsiders are able to exploit their information advantage (Maug







Options Informed traders also use options (Easley, et al. (1998)). This could lead to a lower level of informed trading as some informed traders
exploit their information via the options market.
–38
Table 2 – Variable Definitions
This table lists the names of the variables used in this paper in column Variable Name and the definition used to construct the
respective variable in the column Definition.
Variable Name Definition
IA1 The daily trade size-weighted average of the difference between the quote mid-point right before a transaction and
the quote mid-point 15 minutes, 30 minutes, 60 minutes, or one day later scaled by the first quote mid-point.
IA2 This variable is defined as IA1 less market-wide commonality.
IA3 This variable is defined as IA2 less stock-level trading characteristics.
IARAIN This variable is defined as IA3 less firm-specific structural characteristics.
IAEXIT This variable is defined as the difference between IA1 and IARAIN.
PIN1 The probability of information-based trades provided on a yearly frequency on Soeren Hvidkjaer’s website.
PIN2 This variable is defined as PIN1 purged from market-wide commonality.
PIN3 This variable is defined as PIN2 purged from stock-level trading characteristics.
PINRAIN This variable is defined as PIN3 less firms-level structural characteristics.
PINEXIT This variable is defined as the difference between PIN1 and PINRAIN.
Market-level The value-weighted daily average of the stock-level variables (except for volatility).
Volatility Market-level volatility is measured by the VIX index and by squared daily returns for individual stocks.
Bid-ask spread The time-weighted daily average of the individual BBO percentage spread.
Order-imbalance The absolute daily dollar-imbalance scaled by dollar trading volume orthogonalized to dollar trading volume.
Unexpected changes in
bid-ask spread
The residual of a market-model fitted to stock-level quoted percentage bid-ask spreads.
Unexpected changes in
trading volume
The residuals of a market-model fitted to stock-level dollar volume
Tick size The inverse of the stock price.
Firm size The stock-market capitalization. If used in return regressions, the natural logarithm of the last observation in the
previous calendar year is used.
Book value-to-market
value
The firm-level book-value divided by firm size. If used in return regressions, the natural logarithm of this measure is
used.
Operating profit margin The ratio of operating profit to sales.
Research and develop-
ment-to-sales
The ratio of research and development expenses to sales.
Capital expenditures-to-
sales
The ratio of capital expenditures to sales.
Block-ownership - insider The total fraction of large stakes in common stock held by corporate insiders.
Block-ownership – out-
sider
The total fraction of large stakes in common stock held by corporate outsiders.
Options availability This variable is equal to one if the respective firm has exchange traded options on its common stock and zero other-
wise.
Excess returns on the
market
The monthly returns on the market in excess of the risk-free rate.
SMB The monthly returns on the Fama and French (1995)-factor portfolio SMB.
HML The monthly returns on the Fama and French (1995)-factor portfolio HML.
Excess stock returns The individual monthly stock returns in excess of the risk-free rate.
Beta The stock-level beta coefficient calculated as in Fama and French (1992).
Effective spread The trade size-weighted daily average of the difference between the transaction price and the mid-point of the con-
current primary market BBO quotes.
BETAup This variable is an up-market beta based on the definition of Pattengill and Sundaram (1995) and is equal to the
estimated beta if excess market returns are positive and zero otherwise.
BETAdown This variable is a down-market beta based on the definition of Pattengill and Sundaram (1995) and is equal to the
estimated beta if excess market returns are negative and zero otherwise.39
Table 3 – Summary Statistics
This table reports the summary statistics of the firm-level means of the variables listed in column Name calculated
over the period between January 1995 and December 2005. The column Observations shows the total number of
daily observations and the columns Mean, Q1, Median, Q3, and IQ Range report the mean, the first quartile, the me-
dian, the third quartile, and the difference between Q3 and Q1. The unit of measurement is given by the symbols bp,
%, and $, which refer to basis points, percentages, and dollar values respectively (see Table 2 for variable defini-
tions).
Measure Observations Mean Q1 Median Q3 IQ Range
IA1 over 15 minutes (bp) 3,829,045 24.01 10.74 17.93 29.99 19.25
IA1 over 30 minutes (bp) 3,828,167 24.12 10.79 18.22 30.09 19.30
IA1 over 60 minutes (bp) 3,827,750 24.18 10.79 18.16 30.14 19.35
IA1 over 1 day (bp) 3,543,002 28.05 12.15 20.72 35.11 22.95
PIN1 (%) 22,164 16.39 12.34 15.58 19.67 7.34
Market-level bid-ask spread (bp) 2,770 22.28 8.74 25.02 30.43 21.69
Market-level trading volume (millions of $) 2,770 186.16 97.80 200.54 250.17 152.37
Market-level volatility 2,770 20.70 15.40 20.11 24.44 9.04
Market-level order-imbalance (%) 2,770 26.81 22.64 25.70 29.47 6.83
Company-level bid-ask spread (bp) 3,829,045 84.50 31.02 53.80 99.99 68.97
Unexpected changes in bid-ask spread (bp) 3,829,045 0.17 -0.07 0.00 0.02 0.10
Stock-level trading volume (bp) 3,829,045 85.27 -2.38 0.00 47.88 50.26
Stock-level volatility (bp) 3,829,045 8.75 3.67 5.84 10.06 6.38
Stock-level order-imbalance (%) 3,829,045 53.40 19.93 24.86 33.30 13.36
Stock-level tick size (%) 3,829,045 7.10 3.06 4.62 7.83 4.77
Firm size (10 millions of $) 3,829,045 401.19 37.17 92.87 258.48 221.31
Operating profit margin (%) 3,829,045 17.00 7.19 13.72 24.07 16.88
Book value-to-market value (%) 3,829,045 54.35 26.03 47.83 74.99 48.96
Research and development-to-sales (%) 3,829,045 1.15 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.55
Capital expenditures-to-sales (%) 3,829,045 8.32 1.22 3.72 7.64 6.42
Block-ownership - insiders (%) 3,829,045 3.90 0.00 0.00 1.22 1.22
Block-ownership - outsiders (%) 3,829,045 9.69 0.00 0.52 17.11 17.11
Option availability (%) 3,829,045 62.48 0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Excess return on the market (%) 132 0.70 -2.25 1.53 3.77 6.01
SMB (%) 132 0.22 -2.47 -0.14 2.63 5.10
HML (%) 132 0.43 -1.65 0.45 2.20 3.85
Excess stock returns (%) 174,611 1.07 0.47 1.09 1.84 1.37
Beta 3,629,560 0.97 0.76 0.91 1.15 0.39
Effective spread (%) 3,829,045 0.68 0.26 0.44 0.79 0.53










Table 4 – Correlation of Informed Trading with Explanatory Variables
This table reports the correlation coefficients of the informed trading measures with our explanatory variables (see Table 2 for variable








min 1 day PIN1
IA1 over 30 minutes 0.92
IA1 over 60 minutes 0.83 0.90
IA1 over 1 day 0.33 0.36 0.40
PIN1 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.11
Market bid-ask spread 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.10 0.10
Market trading volume -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.04 -0.15
Market volatility 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.02 -0.06
Market order-imbalance 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04
Stock bid-ask spread 0.56 0.56 0.51 0.23 0.38
Unexp. changes in B/A 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.08 -0.03
Stock trading volume 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.01
Stock volatility 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.01
Stock order-imbalance -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
Stock tick size 0.42 0.41 0.37 0.16 0.26
Firm size -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 -0.05 -0.27
Profit margin -0.12 -0.12 -0.11 -0.05 -0.15
Book-to-market 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.06 0.21
Research and develop-
ment -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.12
Capital expenditures 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
Ownership - insider 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.06
Ownership - outsider -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02
Option availability -0.16 -0.17 -0.15 -0.07 -0.4641
Table 5 – Decomposition of Yearly Informed Trading
This table shows the results of regressing yearly informed trading, InfoTrade1, on a firm-specific intercept and a set of explanatory variables. The results of estimating the
following regression at once is shown in Panel A:
1, , ,0 1 2 3 4
1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 ,
1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , ,
i t i
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i
InfoTrade MBA MVOL MVLA MOIB
VLA BA OIB TIC UEDSpread VOL
Insider Outsider Capex R&D BTM Profit Options Size
    
     
        
    
     
         , t
whereas Panels B and C show the same regression estimated in three steps according to:
1, , ,0 1 2 3 4 ,
2, , ,0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , ,
3, , ,0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4
,
,
i t i i t
i t i i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i i t i t i t i
InfoTrade MBA MVOL MVLA MOIB
InfoTrade VLA BA OIB TIC UEDSpread VOL
InfoTrade Insider Outsider Capex R&D
     
       
    
     
       
     , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , , , t i t i t i t i t i t BTM Profit Options Size          
where InfoTrade1 is alternatively represented by PIN1 or yearly averages of daily IA1. The hypotheses associated with the individual explanatory variables are shown in Table 1
and the variable definitions are shown in Table 2. The regression coefficients associated with PIN1 are in percentages and the coefficients associated with IA1 are in basis points.
P-values of a two-sided t-test of the coefficient being equal to zero are below (Panel A) or to the right (Panels B and C) of the respective coefficients in parentheses. The R
2,
based on the derivation by Nagelkerke (1991), is in percentages. The variables in Panels B and C are presented in decreasing order of their contribution to the R
2.
Panel A – One-step Decomposition of the Information Environment
VOL Vola VOL Vola Insider Outsider Capex R&D BTM Profit
PIN 1 1.01 -1.35 -0.10 0.33 0.80 2.10 50.42 0.63 0.33 -0.51 0.24 -0.73 -0.11 -0.89 -0.24 -0.03 -1.50 -1.37 46.5
(0.00) (0.00) (0.85) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.68) (0.00) (0.00)
IA 1,15 min 9.62 2.13 1.81 2.49 2.52 25.70 22.00 1.30 0.71 1.16 -0.17 -0.63 0.67 -1.03 -0.24 -0.35 -1.42 -10.55 44.3
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.68) (0.56) (0.00) (0.55) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.12) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00)
IA 1,30 min 8.74 1.91 1.89 2.56 2.54 25.17 24.57 0.83 1.43 1.12 -0.24 -0.62 0.65 -1.14 0.18 -0.30 -1.31 -10.62 44.1
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.90) (0.24) (0.00) (0.42) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.23) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00)
IA 1,60 min 9.32 1.83 1.90 2.60 2.46 21.97 23.68 0.92 1.32 1.07 -0.13 -0.54 0.61 -1.31 0.15 -0.44 -1.22 -10.34 48.6
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.25) (0.00) (0.63) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.31) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
IA 1,1 day 10.60 1.27 1.81 3.64 5.86 0.99 36.30 1.08 0.32 1.11 0.44 0.10 0.57 -1.88 -0.22 -1.55 -1.25 -10.94 31.9
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Table 5 – Decomposition of Yearly Informed Trading (continued)
Panel B – Three-step Decomposition of the Information Environment Captured by PIN1
Variable Coeff p-value R
2
Volume -1.31 (0.00) 39.7
Order-imbalance 0.54 (0.00)
Volatility 0.14 (0.00)
Bid-ask spread 0.37 (0.00)
Order-imbalance 0.34 (0.00) 43.5
UED Spread -0.28 (0.00)
Volume 1.87 (0.00)
Bid-ask spread 0.13 (0.00)
Volatility 54.00 (0.08)
Tick size 0.04 (0.35)
Firm size -1.15 (0.00) 34.8
Ownership - corporate outsiders -0.77 (0.00)
Research and development -0.92 (0.00)
Option availability -2.47 (0.00)
Book-to-market -0.29 (0.00)
Ownership - corporate insiders 0.27 (0.01)
Capital expenditures -0.14 (0.07)




Panel C – Three-step Decomposition of the Information Environment Captured by IA1
Coeff p-value R
2




Volatility 29.47 (0.00) 30.7
UED Spread 2.98 (0.00)
Bid-ask spread 1.83 (0.00)
Volume 26.50 (0.00)
Tick size 2.61 (0.00)
Order-imbalance 1.24 (0.00)
Firm size -9.27 (0.00) 21.2
Profit margin -0.64 (0.00)
Option availability -1.15 (0.00)
Capital expenditures 0.50 (0.02)
Research and development -1.29 (0.01)
Ownership - corporate outsiders -0.21 (0.34)
Book-to-market -0.14 (0.35)





Table 6 – Time-series and Cross-sectional Associations in Daily Informed Trading
This table shows the results of regressing daily values of informed trading measured by IA1 on a firm-specific intercept and a set of
explanatory variables by firm size decile according to:
1, , ,0 1 2 3 4 ,
2, , ,0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , ,
3, , ,0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6
,
,
i t i i t
i t i i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i i t i t i t i t i t i
IA MBA MVOL MVLA MOIB
IA VLA BA OIB TIC UEDSpread VOL
IA Insider Outsider Capex R&D BTM Profit
     
       
      
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       , 7 , 8 , , , t i t i t i t Options Size      
where IA1 is estimated over 60 minutes. The hypotheses associated with the individual explanatory variables are shown in Table 1 and
the variable definitions are shown in Table 2. Panel A presents the results of regressing IA1 on variables that capture market-wide
commonality. Panel B presents the results of regressing IA2 on stock-level trading characteristics, and Panel C shows the results of
regressing IA3 on firm-specific structural characteristics. In the table below, the column Decile shows the size group with Decile 10
referring to the largest size group. Regression coefficients shown in column Coeff are in basis points, p-values are to the right of the
respective coefficients in parentheses and the R
2 is in percentages (based on the derivation by Nagelkerke (1991)). The variables are
presented in decreasing order of their contribution to the average explanatory power going from the left to the right.
Panel A – Market-wide Commonality in Daily Informed Trading
p-value p-value p-value p-value
1 14.08 (0.00) 5.99 (0.00) 4.13 (0.00) 0.16 (0.32) 37.2
2 11.26 (0.00) 2.81 (0.00) 2.75 (0.00) 0.43 (0.00) 40.7
3 10.38 (0.00) 2.64 (0.00) 1.65 (0.00) 0.36 (0.00) 41.3
4 8.76 (0.00) 1.73 (0.00) 1.27 (0.00) 0.69 (0.00) 40.6
5 7.80 (0.00) 1.46 (0.00) 1.13 (0.00) 0.92 (0.00) 40.1
6 7.02 (0.00) 1.40 (0.00) 0.91 (0.00) 1.18 (0.00) 39.7
7 6.05 (0.00) 0.97 (0.00) 0.61 (0.00) 1.12 (0.00) 39.2
8 5.26 (0.00) 0.80 (0.00) 0.59 (0.00) 1.21 (0.00) 38.5
9 4.26 (0.00) 0.55 (0.00) 0.32 (0.00) 1.25 (0.00) 37.8
10 3.24 (0.00) 0.50 (0.00) 0.39 (0.00) 1.34 (0.00) 38.1
Volume Bid-ask spread Volatility Order-imbalance
Coeff R
2 Decile Coeff Coeff Coeff
Panel B – Informed Trading and Stock-level Trading Characteristics
p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value
1 5.09 (0.00) 3.08 (0.00) 12.60 (0.00) 7.16 (0.00) 3.09 (0.00) 4.06 (0.00) 39.1
2 5.81 (0.00) 3.12 (0.00) 4.98 (0.00) 3.41 (0.00) -1.30 (0.00) 3.00 (0.00) 39.6
3 5.64 (0.00) 2.90 (0.00) 3.56 (0.00) 2.44 (0.00) -1.06 (0.00) 2.73 (0.00) 39.4
4 7.47 (0.00) 2.82 (0.00) 2.50 (0.00) 1.89 (0.00) -1.04 (0.00) 2.38 (0.00) 39.2
5 4.30 (0.00) 2.34 (0.00) 2.02 (0.00) 1.68 (0.00) -0.62 (0.00) 2.08 (0.00) 37.8
6 6.60 (0.00) 2.16 (0.00) 1.54 (0.00) 1.44 (0.00) -0.65 (0.00) 1.87 (0.00) 37.3
7 5.49 (0.00) 1.56 (0.00) 1.17 (0.00) 1.15 (0.00) -0.28 (0.00) 1.71 (0.00) 36.3
8 8.84 (0.00) 1.43 (0.00) 0.69 (0.00) 1.03 (0.00) -0.28 (0.00) 1.68 (0.00) 36.2
9 8.08 (0.00) 1.12 (0.00) 0.44 (0.00) 0.88 (0.00) -0.23 (0.00) 1.64 (0.00) 35.2
10 12.32 (0.00) 0.91 (0.00) 0.11 (0.00) 0.81 (0.00) -0.04 (0.04) 1.68 (0.00) 37.4
Volatility Bid-ask spread Order-imbalance Tick size UED Spread Volume
R
2 Decile Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff
(continued)44
Table 6 – Time-series and Cross-sectional Associations in Daily Informed Trading
(continued)
Panel C – Informed Trading and Firm-specific Structural Characteristics
p-val p-val p-val p-val p-val p-val p-val p-val
1 -21.67 (0.00) -2.24 (0.00) -1.11 (0.00) 9.00 (0.00) 6.57 (0.00) -2.24 (0.01) 1.26 (0.00) 5.46 (0.00) 32.9
2 -18.95 (0.00) -2.53 (0.00) -0.31 (0.05) 1.19 (0.00) -1.79 (0.00) -2.74 (0.00) -0.01 (0.98) 4.50 (0.00) 37.9
3 -9.83 (0.00) -2.26 (0.00) -0.03 (0.82) 0.58 (0.01) 0.12 (0.67) -1.65 (0.00) -1.29 (0.00) 1.79 (0.00) 37.9
4 -9.23 (0.00) -1.31 (0.00) 0.55 (0.00) 0.51 (0.00) 1.73 (0.00) 0.13 (0.73) -0.79 (0.00) 1.11 (0.00) 35.9
5 -4.35 (0.00) -1.39 (0.00) 0.13 (0.27) 0.52 (0.00) 1.38 (0.00) 0.60 (0.17) -0.02 (0.91) -0.31 (0.00) 35.7
6 -6.20 (0.00) -0.87 (0.00) 0.04 (0.68) 1.03 (0.00) 0.30 (0.07) 0.43 (0.23) -1.11 (0.00) -1.66 (0.00) 34.6
7 -3.87 (0.00) -0.89 (0.00) 0.51 (0.00) 0.86 (0.00) 0.35 (0.01) -0.11 (0.65) -0.21 (0.05) -0.87 (0.00) 33.9
8 -2.82 (0.00) -0.40 (0.00) 0.91 (0.00) 0.25 (0.00) -0.19 (0.10) -1.55 (0.00) 0.20 (0.05) -1.09 (0.00) 32.3
9 -2.26 (0.00) -0.35 (0.00) 0.27 (0.00) -0.17 (0.00) -0.66 (0.00) -0.61 (0.00) -0.13 (0.13) -0.62 (0.00) 31.3
10 -1.31 (0.00) 0.16 (0.00) 0.38 (0.00) 0.14 (0.00) 0.35 (0.00) 0.66 (0.00) -0.23 (0.00) -0.31 (0.00) 30.7
BTM Options Profit Firm Size Insider Capex Outsider R&D
Decile Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff Coeff R
2 Coeff Coeff Coeff45
Table 7 – Analysis of Common Variation and Idiosyncratic Informed Trading
The table below shows a decomposition of explained variation in informed trading,    1 Var IA , into three components by
estimating the following regression for every stock individually:
1, 0 , , , 1 1 1 . t i i t j j t k k t t i j k IA Commonality Trading Structural     
          
Thereafter, the following statistics are calculated:
 
  
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where REP denotes the relative explanatory power related to i market-wide Commonality components, to j stock-level Trading
characteristics and to k Structural characteristics. Numbers below are averages of the firm-level REPCommonality, REPTrading, and
REPStructural calculated by regressing IA1 estimated over 60 minutes for each stock individually on all explanatory variables and
summing up the ratios of explained to total variance by commonality, trading, and structural components. Unexplained Informed
Trading is the average of one minus the R-square from the stock-level ordinary least-square regressions. Results are shown by
firm size decile, where Size Decile is calculated based on the average market capitalization a firm has over the entire sample




1 27.7 64.4 7.9 78.1
2 32.8 59.6 7.6 75.7
3 40.8 52.3 6.9 73.7
4 43.7 49.3 7.0 73.8
5 47.1 45.3 7.6 73.1
6 47.6 44.8 7.6 71.8
7 53.4 39.7 6.9 72.1
8 57.7 36.1 6.2 70.9
9 62.4 31.0 6.6 69.3
10 60.9 33.6 5.4 68.0
Average Relative Explanatory Power of (in %)
Market-wide Firm-specific Stock-level
Size Decile Trading Characteristics Structural Characteristics Commonality46
Table 8 – Cross-sectional Returns and Components of Informed Trading
This table shows the results of a Fama and MacBeth (1973)-type cross-sectional regression of monthly portfolio returns in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate on a
set of explanatory variables and the average level of informed trading during the previous month. The regression is estimated monthly January 1995 and December 2005:
0 1 , 2 , 3 4 5 , ,
e
p up p down p p up k p t R BETA BETA Size BTM InfoTrade              
where BETAup and BETAdown are up-market and down-market betas, respectively, the subscript p denotes portfolio p, and InfoTradek refers to the measure k of informed
trading or the average level of daily effective spread during the previous month (see Table 2 for variable definitions). Panel A shows the results when the regressions are
estimated using the monthly excess returns of 50 portfolios formed on the average level of InfoTradek during the previous year, whereby InfoTradek is captured by PIN1,
PIN2, PIN3, PINRAIN, or PINEXIT. Panel B shows the results when the regressions are estimated using the monthly excess returns of 50 portfolios formed on the average
level of InfoTradek during the previous month, whereby InfoTradek is captured by the effective spread, IA1, IA2, IA3, IARAIN, or IAEXIT. IARAIN2 or PINRAIN2 is calculated by
regressing all explanatory variables on IA1. Portfolios are based on IARAIN or PINRAIN if InfoTradek is not included in the regression. IA1 is estimated over 60 minutes. T-
values are based on the Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979)-adjustment. The coefficients, shown in columns Coeff, are in percentages with p-values based on a two-
sided t-test of the coefficient being equal to zero in parentheses to the right of the respective coefficients. The column R
2 shows the average adjusted R-square from the
individual cross-sectional regressions.
Panel A – Cross-sectional Return-Association of PIN1
Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val R
2
-0.69 (0.00) -0.37 (0.00) -6.73 (0.00) 3.42 (0.00) 3.27 (0.01) 23.2
2.38 (0.06) -0.78 (0.00) -0.23 (0.08) -6.99 (0.00) 2.59 (0.00) 2.59 (0.10) 29.9
2.23 (0.04) -0.76 (0.00) -0.25 (0.06) -7.00 (0.00) 2.50 (0.00) 2.81 (0.07) 29.9
1.92 (0.04) -0.56 (0.00) -0.16 (0.24) -6.78 (0.00) 3.33 (0.00) 1.61 (0.33) 29.5
2.52 (0.03) -0.72 (0.00) -0.26 (0.05) -5.96 (0.00) 3.21 (0.00) 2.00 (0.18) 26.5
-6.11 (0.34) -0.55 (0.00) -0.82 (0.00) -5.81 (0.00) 3.05 (0.00) 6.76 (0.00) 27.5





Market Intercept Down-market Up-market PINEXIT PINRAIN2
(continued)
Panel B – Cross-sectional Return-Association of IA1
Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val Coeff p-val R
2
-96.72 (0.00) -0.04 (0.98) 0.20 (0.04) -1.26 (0.00) 1.98 (0.00) -2.02 (0.21) 27.4
-0.50 (0.16) 0.17 (0.01) -1.19 (0.00) 1.78 (0.00) -2.37 (0.20) 22.6
326.68 (0.00) 0.00 (0.77) -0.07 (0.08) -1.32 (0.00) 1.38 (0.00) 2.62 (0.28) 29.7
329.68 (0.00) -0.19 (0.70) -0.08 (0.05) -1.43 (0.00) 1.42 (0.00) 2.71 (0.12) 32.6
221.50 (0.00) 0.08 (0.47) -0.24 (0.08) -1.75 (0.00) 1.28 (0.00) 5.36 (0.02) 33.8
369.09 (0.00) -0.10 (0.99) -0.26 (0.01) -1.18 (0.00) 1.35 (0.00) -3.37 (0.03) 34.7
-608.68 (0.00) -0.09 (0.59) 0.00 (0.88) -1.46 (0.00) 2.29 (0.00) 0.48 (0.71) 36.6





Firm Size Down-market Up-market Intercept IARAIN
Effective
Spread IA1 IA2 IA3 IAEXIT47
Table 9 – Pooled Time-series Cross-sectional Association of Informed Trading and Returns
This table shows the results of fitting a pooled time-series cross-sectional generalized least square regression of monthly portfolio excess returns on monthly factor
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Subscript s denotes the firm size group, subscript p indicates the book-to-market group, subscript j the rank of the level of informed trading, and t is the time-
index. Five monthly firm size groups and book-to-market groups are formed based on firm size and the book-to-market ratio at the end of the previous year. Simi-
larly, the average level of informed trading of every stock during the previous month is used to calculate informed trading quintiles. The lowest level of informed
trading is assigned informed trading quintile rank 1 and the highest level of informed trading is assigned quintile rank 5. Portfolio excess returns, R
e, are calcu-
lated as the equally-weighted cross-sectional mean of monthly stock returns in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate of all stocks that are in the same firm
size group and have the same informed trading quintile rank (to calculate , ,
e
s j t R ) or that are in the same firm size group, are in the same book-to-market group, and
have the same informed trading quintile rank (to calculate , , ,
e
s p j t R ). , ,
m
s j t R , SMBs,j,t, and HMLs,j,t are equal to the market excess returns, and the returns on the SMB
and HML factor portfolios, if the respective portfolio belongs to firm size group s and to informed trading quintile rank j and zero otherwise. , , ,
m
s p j t R , SMBs,p,j,t,
and HMLs,p,j,t are equal to the market excess returns, and the returns on the SMB and HML factor portfolios if the respective portfolio belongs to firm size group s,
to book-to-market group p, and to informed trading quintile rank j and zero otherwise. Informed trading is captured by IA1 estimated over 60 minutes. The estima-
tion uses a generalized least square regression with a random intercept model to account for potential correlation within portfolios. The column Portfolio Sort
shows that the portfolios are formed based on size, book-to-market, and informed trading (Size, BTM, and IA). The portfolio-specific coefficients of R
m, SMB, and
HML are suppressed for clarity of exposition. Coefficients (Coeff) are in percentages and the associated p-value is in parentheses to the right.
IA1 IA2 IA3 IARAIN IAEXIT
Portfolio Sort Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Size, BTM, and IA –1.1 (0.68) 42.2 (1.00) 0.8 (0.80) 3.0 (0.01) 1.3 (0.56)48
Table 10
Principal Component Analysis on RAIN
This table reports the results of a principal component analysis on the RAIN time-series. Only stocks that have observations for at
least 97.5% of the sample period are used. The column “RAIN Based on” shows the horizon over which IA1 used to construct
RAIN is estimated, the column Number of Days shows the number of days of the sample period included in the estimation,
whereas Number of Firms shows how many individual firms are included. Sample Variance Explained (%) shows the percentage
of the total RAIN-variance explained by the first, second, and third principal component (PC), whereby the second row shows the
cumulative variance explained.
Sample Variance Explained (%)




IA1 over 15 minutes 1,235.00 656.00 7.05 3.77 1.08
7.05 10.82 11.90
IA1 over 30 minutes 1,244.00 655.00 5.17 2.78 0.96
5.17 7.95 8.92
IA1 over 60 minutes 1,224.00 656.00 4.20 2.00 0.93
4.20 6.20 7.13
IA1 over 1 day 1,253.00 574.00 3.41 1.02 0.89
3.41 4.43 5.32 
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